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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

the Berlin court inadvertently may have engaged in an unwarranted
act of judicial legislation.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW

CPL § 20.20(2)(b): Criminaljurisdictionexercised over out-of-state
assault committed aboardan in-flight aircraft.
Section 20.20(2)(b) of the CPL provides that a New York court
may exercise jurisdiction over a criminal offense in which no criminal conduct occurred in the state if "[t]he statute defining the
offense is designed to prevent the occurrence of a particular effect
in this state and the conduct constituting the offense committed
was performed with intent that it would have such effect."' 10 This
potentially broad jurisdictional grant is, limited by CPL § 20.10(4)
which defines a "particular effect" as "a materially harmful impact
upon the governmental processes or community welfare of a particu1 Despite the restrictive effect of this definition,
lar jurisdiction."'03
the New York City Criminal Court, Queens County, in People v.
difficulty in litigation and has been condemned as unfair in operation and unsound
in principle by every modem student of the law of evidence.
Id. As a result of fervent opposition, the committee later withdrew this recommendation. See
RICHARDSON, supra note 78, § 396. Professor McCormick, a noted commentator on the law of

evidence, also had recommended that the statute be eliminated. According to McCormick,
if the interested witness is permitted to testify, a "searching cross-examination," along with
an observation of the witness' demeanor on the stand, will furnish a sufficient basis for
evaluating the witness' credibility. In rejecting the statute's positive aspects, Professor
McCormick stated that "[olne who would not balk at perjury will hardly hesitate at suborning a third person, who would not be disqualified, to swear to the false story." C. McCoRMICK,
LAW OF EVIDEN E § 65 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
It would appear that the Dead Man's Statute is disfavored by the New York courts. See
Phillips v. Joseph Kantor & Co., 31 N.Y.2d 307, 291 N.E.2d 129, 338 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1972),
wherein the Court, faced with an accounting malpractice situation, permitted evidence excludable at trial under CPLR 4519 to be utilized to defeat a motion for summary judgment;
Ward v. Kovacs, 55 App. Div. 2d 391,390 N.Y.S.2d 931 (2d Dep't 1977), wherein an interested
plaintiff introduced into evidence the deceased defendant's deposition taken prior to trial and
was then permitted to testify regarding transactions with the decedent covered in the deposition. One commentator reasoned that decisions such as Phillipsreflect a "reluctance of the
higher courts in this state to impose the bar of the statute if there is any possibility that it
may be averted." 5 WK&M 4519.06. Although courts thus may seek to limit the provisions
of CPLR 4519 whenever possible, the courts in Phillips and Ward did not deny completely
the statute's applicability. In Phillips, the court ruled that the statute contains language
rendering it applicable only at the actual trial, while in Ward the court merely construed an
express exception in the statute. See, e.g., Nay v. Curley, 113 N.Y. 575, 21 N.E. 698 (1889).
In contrast to the decision in Berlin, however, the Court of Appeals in Phillips, stated that
"[u]pon a trial, the full policy of the Dead Man's Statute will be given unstinting application." 31 N.Y.2d 307, 315, 291 N.E.2d 129, 133, 338 N.Y.S.2d 882, 888 (1972).
'1 CPL § 20.20(2)(b). See generally 1 M. WAxNER, NEW YORK CRIMINAL PRACTICE
1.2[1] (1976 & Supp. 1977).
'0 CPL § 20.10(4).
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Corsino,'°4 expansively construed section 20.20(2)(b), holding that
New York may criminally prosecute an assault committed on board
a jet aircraft in airspace outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
State. 0 '
Jose Corsino was charged with two counts of assault in the third
degree,' 6 and one count of harassment' 7 for allegedly striking a
flight steward employed by American Airlines. The incident giving
rise to the prosecution took place aboard a flight originating in the
Dominican Republic and bound for John F. Kennedy Airport in
Queens County. Since the plane was not in New York airspace at
the time of the event in question, defendant contended that the
criminal court lacked jurisdiction to try him.' 8 Remarking that the
issue was one of first impression,' 9 Judge Zelman ruled that CPL
§ 20.20(2)(b) provided a basis for jurisdiction because "[m]isdemeanor assaults that occur on planes en route to New York
could have a materially harmful impact upon the welfare of New
York's community.""' By creating the "threat of physical harm
to visitors and to residents . . .who use the airports as a means
of ingress to the State,""' the court reasoned, such assaults have a
particular effect in New York within the meaning of CPL § 20.20
(2)(b)."12 Therefore, Judge Zelman denied defendant's motion to
dismiss and directed that the action proceed to trial.' 3
10491 Misc. 2d 46, 397 N.Y.S.2d 342 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Queens County 1977).
"D

Id. at 49, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 344.

101N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00 (McKinney 1975).

107Id. § 240.25.
1" 91 Misc. 2d at 47, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 343. Had the assault occurred in New York
airspace, jurisdiction would have been available under CPL § 20.20(1)(a), which extends the
power of the State criminal courts to conduct occurring within "New York State as its
boundaries are prescribed in the state law, and the space over it." CPL § 20.10(1).
10991 Misc. 2d at 47, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 344. Although the CPL has been in effect for over
6 years, the "particular effect" provision rarely has been the subject of judicial interpretation.
It appears, however, that Judge Zelman overlooked two recent New York cases which construed this statute. See Steingut v. Gold, 54 App. Div. 2d 481, 388 N.Y.S.2d 622 (2d Dep't
1976); People v. Puig, 85 Misc. 2d 228, 378 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976),
discussed in notes 118-120 and accompanying text infra.
,, 91 Misc. 2d at 48, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 344.
Id. In order to convict Corsino of the offenses with which he was charged, the criminal
court first had to establish that it had jurisdiction pursuant to § 20.20 of the CPL, which
prescribes the criminal jurisdiction of the state. Since the remaining subsections of CPL §
20.20 were inapplicable to the circumstances of Corsino, see CPL § 20.20, the court had to
fit the case within the language of § 20.20(2)(b) or dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
112 91 Misc. 2d at 49, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 344.
"' Id. at 50, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 345. It would seem that defendant Corsino could have been
prosecuted under the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
Section 1472(j) of that Act provides:
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It would seem that the Corsino court erroneously' applied the
statutory formula of section 20.20(2)(b). To the extent that it confers criminal jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts merely threatening to have an effect in New York, section 20.20(2)(b) appears to be
derived from the protective theory of jurisdiction. Under this principle, a state may prosecute conduct occurring totally without its
borders if such conduct might have an adverse impact upon the
governmental processes of the state.114 Protective jurisdiction classically would be exercised only over activities proscribed by statutes
enacted to preserve the sovereignty of the state or uphold other
important state interests." 5 Similarly, CPL § 20.20(2)(b) may be
Whoever, while aboard an aircraft within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the
United States, assaults. . . any flight crew member or flight attendant (including
any steward or stewardess) of such aircraft, so as to interfere with the performance
by such member or attendant of his duties.

. .

shall be fined.

. .

or imprisoned.

Id. § 1472(0) (1970). The "special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States" includes "any
• . . aircraft within the United States" as well as "any other aircraft outside the United
States that has its next scheduled destination or last point of departure in the United States,
if that aircraft next actually lands in the United States . . . while that aircraft is in flight."
Id. § 1301(34)(c), (d), (e) (Supp. V 1975). An examination of federal cases indicates that
assaults upon aircraft crew members have been prosecuted under 49 U.S.C. § 1472(j). See,
e.g., United States v. Meeker, 527 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1975) (assault upon pilot of private plane);
Mims v. United States, 332 F.2d 944 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964) (assault
upon flight crew member).
In sustaining the exercise of jurisdiction in Corsino, the court rejected the argument that
this federal criminal statute preempted state prosecution of in-flight crimes. 91 Misc. 2d at
49, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 344-45 (citing H.R. REP. No. 958, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in
[1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2564), wherein Congress declared its intention that the
state criminal law coexist with the federal statute. The Corsino court noted that a state
statute will not be deemed to have been preempted in the absence of either a congressional
intent to occupy the entire field or a direct conflict between the state and federal legislation.
91 Misc. 2d at 49, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 344. Accord, Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374
U.S. 424, 430 (1963). See also Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on
Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975). Finding neither of these
factors present in the instant situation, Judge Zelman concluded that New York may prosecute defendant for an in-flight assault. 91 Misc. 2d at 49-50, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
I As traditionally stated, the protective theory empowers a state "to prescribe a rule of
law attaching legal consequences to conduct outside its territory that threatens its security
as a state or the operation of its governmental functions, provided the conduct is generally
recognized as a crime under the law of the states that have reasonably developed legal
systems." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONs LAw § 33 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as RESTATEMENT].
"I See note 114 supra. The protective theory was exhaustively treated in a landmark
study of the principles of criminal jurisdiction. See Harvard Research in InternationalLaw,
Jurisdictionwith Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter cited as
HarvardResearch]. According to this study, protective jurisdiction renders states competent
to legislate for the punishment of crimes threatening the "security, integrity, or independence" of the state. Id. at 543. See United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10-11 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968); RESTATEMENT, supra note 114, § 33, Comment d at 93. But
see United States v. Daniszewski, 380 F. Supp. 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), wherein the court, in
the course of upholding federal criminal jurisdiction, indicated that the purview of the protec-
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invoked as a jurisdictional predicate when "[t]he statute defining
the offense is designed to prevent the occurrence of'" conduct having a "materially harmful impact upon the governmental processes
or community welfare of a particular jurisdiction.""' 7 As construed
in several recent New York decisions, this language authorizes criminal prosecution of extraterritorial offenses violative of enactments
"designed to uphold the integrity of governmental or judicial processes of the State or its subdivisions;" it does not permit the exercise of jurisdiction over offenses defined by penal statutes relating
8
to the general community welfare."
tive theory is not "confined to those species of conduct abroad that threaten certain narrowly
defined interests in the security of the enacting state and in the integrity of its governmental
operations"; rather, the court was of the opinion that the theory encompasses all "acts abroad
which threaten the peace of the enacting state as that peace lies in the security of its citizens
from criminal intrusion." Id. at 115-16.
The protective theory must be distinguished from another principle of jurisdiction known
as the objective territorial theory. Pursuant to the latter principle, a state may prosecute an
individual for extraterritorial conduct that actually produces adverse effects in the state. See,
e.g., Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927); Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911);
United States v. Fernandez, 496 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir. 1974); RESTATEMENT, supra note 114, §
18. In contrast, where the out-of-state conduct only has a potentially adverse effect upon the
governmental processes of the state, the proper basis for jurisdiction is the protective principle. Id., § 33, Comment d at 93.
The federal courts have made extensive use of the protective and objective territorial
theories to prosecute foreign perpetrators. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 496 F.2d
1294 (5th Cir. 1974) (jurisdiction under objective territorial theory to try defendant for uttering in Mexico forged checks drawn on the United States Treasury); United States v. Williams, 464 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1972) (objective territorial theory relied upon to prosecute Jamaican citizen for aiding illegal aliens to gain entry into the United States); United States v.
Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968) (federal district court has
jurisdiction under the protective principle to try a Canadian citizen for knowingly falsifying
a visa application at the consulate in Montreal); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961) (jurisdiction available under the protective theory to
try defendants for conspiracy to gain unlawful entry into the United States).
"I CPL § 20.20(2)(b).
17 Id. § 20.10(4).
The provisions of the CPL also embody other principles of jurisdiction. For example, CPL
§ 20.20(1) prescribes the territorial jurisdiction of New York's criminal courts. See CPL §
20.20, commentary at 45 (McKinney 1971). In addition, certain subsections of CPL § 20.20(2)
are premised upon the objective territorial principle of jurisdiction. Thus, New York criminal
courts may prosecute extraterritorial conduct where "[t]he offense committed was a result
offense and the result occurred within [New York]," id. § 20.20(2)(a), or where an overt act
in furtherance of an out-of-state conspiracy to commit a crime in New York occurred within
this State. Id. § 20.20(2) (d). In both of these situations an "effect" actuallyis produced within
New York, as is required under the objective territorial principle. See note 115 supra.
I's People v. Puig, 85 Misc. 2d 228, 235, 378 N.Y.S.2d 925, 935 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1976). For a discussion of Puig, see The Survey, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 771, 807 (1976), wherein
it was concluded that the purpose of CPL § 20.20(2)(b) is to protect New York from out-ofstate offenses which tend to corrupt its governmental processes. Id. at 811.
In Steingut v. Gold, 54 App. Div. 2d 481, 388 N.Y.S.2d 622 (2d Dep't 1976) the Appellate
Division, Second Department, had occasion to construe CPL § 20.40(2)(c), which apportions
the "jurisdiction" of counties within New York State. Under CPL § 2 0.40(2)(c), a criminal
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It is suggested that the sections of the penal law punishing
assault in the third degree and harassment were not promulgated
to preserve the integrity of the state and therefore are not within the
class of offenses over which CPL § 20.20(2)(b) jurisdiction may be
exercised."' Unfortunately, the Corsino court failed to consider
whether the offenses of assault and harassment are within the ambit
of section 20.20(2)(b). Instead, the court focused its analysis upon
the harmful effect in New York of a physical act of assault committed aboard an in-flight aircraft. 10 In so doing, Judge Zelman apparently reached an incorrect decision to uphold jurisdiction over Cor12
sino's allegedly criminal conduct. '
court of a particular county may exercise jurisdiction over conduct occurring outside the
county if "[s]uch conduct had, or was likely to have, a particulareffect upon . . . [the
county in which the court is sitting] and was performed with intent that it would . . have
such particulareffect therein." Id. (emphasis added). Although Steingut does not deal specifically with CPL § 20.20(2)(b), the case is pertinent because it interprets the term "particular
effect," which is contained in § 20.20(2)(b) as well as § 20.40(2)(c). The Steingut court found
that for conduct to have a particular effect, it "must cause a harmful impact, not on any
individual or individuals, but on a whole community and the harm must be to 'governmental
processes' (i.e., the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government) or to the
welfare of an entire community." 54 App. Div. 2d at 488, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 627. The court
stressed that the impact must be "definable and important." Id.
Thus, under both the Steingut and Puig readings of the words "particular effect," there
is no jurisdiction over out-of-state conduct under CPL § 20.20(2)(b) unless such conduct
violates a statute intended to protect the integrity of the state. This view is in accord with
the legislative history of CPL § 20.20(2)(b), which indicates that the section was intended to
protect the governmental processes of the state. See TEMPORARY COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE
PENAL LAW AND CRIMINAL CODE, PROPOSED NEW YORK CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW § 10.20(3),
Staff Comment at 41 (1967), wherein it was stated: "The kinds of offenses contemplated by
[the section] are exemplified by bribery and perjury, the 'effects' of which are confined to
corruption of New York's governmental and judicial processes."
"j See People v. Puig, 85 Misc. 2d 228, 378 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976),
wherein the court held that § 20.20(2)(b) jurisdiction does not extend to extraterritorial
conduct violative of the controlled substance sections of the penal law; CPL § 20.20(2)(b),
commentary at 48 (McKinney 1971); note 118 supra.
'1 See 91 Misc. 2d at 48, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 344. The court in People v. Puig, 85 Misc. 2d
228, 378 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976), warned against this improper application
of § 20.20(2)(b) when it stated that "[tihe [subsection] does not speak . . . in terms of the
possible impact of the out-of-State conduct alleged in the indictment, but rather in terms of
the design or intent of the statute defining the offense." 85 Misc. 2d at 233, 378 N.Y.S.2d at
934 (emphasis added).
2I There exists another reason for questioning the Corsino result. A second requirement
for § 20.20(2)(b) jurisdiction is that defendant have an intent to bring about a particular
effect in New York. CPL § 20.20(2)(b). See CPL § 20.20(2)(b), commentary at 48 (McKinney
1971); R. PrrLER, NEW YoRK CRIMINAL PRACTICE UNDER THE CPL § 1.8 (1972). No inquiry was
conducted by the court, however, concerning defendant's state of mind at the time he performed the relevant conduct. It is somewhat unlikely that defendant, who was alleged to have
been involved in a mid-air assault, had an intent to cause a particular effect in New York.
In any event, it is submitted that the court's failure to consider this issue renders its decision
suspect.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:137

By failing to apply properly the jurisdictional predicate contained in CPL § 20.20(2)(b), it is submitted that the Corsino court
extended New York's extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction to a situation not envisioned by the legislature' 2 nor justified by the language of the statute. 3 It is hoped that future decisions will adhere
to the test established by the CPL and thereby limit criminal jurisdiction to the bounds prescribed by the legislature.
FAMILY COURT

ACT

Family Court Act §§ 413-414: Divorced mother must share in the
financial support of her children.
As a consequence of the current focus upon equal treatment of
the sexes,' 4 courts have been faced with an increasingly large number of equal protection challenges directed at statutes employing
sex-based classifications.'25 It is not surprising, therefore, that sections 413121 and 414127 of the Family Court Act, which seem to place
the primary obligation for child support upon the father,' 2 have
122See

note 118 supra.
notes 114-118 and accompanying text supra.
I For a general overview of the changing status of women and the effects of the women's
rights movement see W. CHAFE, WOMEN AND EQUALITY (1977). See generally CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, IMPACT ERA LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBILITIES 144-215 (1976);
S. FELDMAN, THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN 31-71 (1974); I. MURPHY, PUBLIC POLICY ON THE STATUS OF
122See

WOMEN

19-100 (1973);

THE WOMEN'S MovEMENT

41-63 (H. Wortis & C. Rabinowitz eds. 1972).

See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
New York courts also have been confronted with equal protection attacks upon various statutes. See, e.g., People v. Moss, 80 Misc. 2d 633, 366 N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1975); In re Louise B., 68 Misc. 2d 95, 326 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Family Ct. Monroe County 1971).
Moreover, passage of the New York Human Rights Law, codified in N.Y. EXEC. LAw §§ 290301 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1976-1977), has led to the invalidation of several statutory
distinctions based upon sex. See, e.g., Board of Ed. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 42 App.
Div. 2d 49, 345 N.Y.S.2d 93 (2d Dep't 1973), aff'd mem., 35 N.Y.2d 675, 319 N.E.2d 203, 360
N.Y.S.2d 887 (1974).
,21 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 413 (McKinney 1975) provides in pertinent part:
The father of a child under the age of twenty-one years is chargeable with the
support of his child and, if possessed of sufficient means or able to earn such means,
may be required to pay for such child's support a fair and reasonable sum according
to his means, as the court may determine.
12, Id. § 414 states that
[i]f the father of a child is dead, incapable of supporting his child, or cannot
be found within the state, the mother of such child is chargeable with its support
where such child has not attained the age of twenty-one years and, if possessed of
sufficient means or able to earn such means, may be required to pay for its support
a fair and reasonable sum according to her means, as the court may determine. The
court may. apportion the costs of the support of the child between the parents
according to their respective means and responsibilities.
'" Prior decisions, reflecting the early common law position, found that the obligation
1'

